4 New Opinions and an En Banc Grant

The Court of Appeals of Virginia released 4 published opinions this week and also announced the granting of a petition for rehearing en banc. The en banc was granted in Michael Brown v. Timothy L. Kirkpatrick, which was not unexpected. In fact, in the analysis of the 2-1 opinion posted just over a month ago, I stated confidently that the en banc or an appeal to the Supreme Court was certain. Indeed, even when the en banc opinion comes down, I suspect that it will be a split and the Supreme Court will grant review.

Moving on to the new opinions, the most consequential, at least for civil practitioners, is David Willems, et al. v. James Batcheller, et al. The case is a garden-variety dispute about a garden. Specifically, the Willems filed a complaint of trespass an nuisance wit respect to the Batchellers' bamboo plants. What makes this case consequential is that in response to the suit, the Batchellers raised, inter alia, a defense of adverse possession, claiming that a fence constructed by the previous owner of their property had enclosed some of the Willems property and had been in place for the statutorily required period, giving the Batchellers title to that land.

Now, there were many issues raised in the trial court and its split decision, requiring the Batchellers to "control" the spread of the bamboo, but also setting the new property line as the fence line, thus giving the Batchellers title to the property on their side of the fence, satisfied neither party. The Willems appealed and the Batchellers assigned cross-error.

The Court of Appeals, Judge Athey joined by Judges Beales and O'Brien, today affirm the finding that the bamboo was a nuisance and requiring the Batchellers to control its growth so as to not encroach on the Willems property. However, the Court finds that the circuit court did not have the power to declare a new property line based on the affirmative defense of adverse possession. While the defense was a proper claim to defeat the alleged trespass, it did not amount to a counter-claim seeking relief in the form of a declaration that the property was lawfully the Batchellers'. This is a very important lesson in the difference between offensive and defensive pleading. The Batchellers will no doubt be taking the offense in a new suit to have the property line established.

One final point about this case. Contrary to popular belief, bamboo is capable of growing in subtropical climates with cold winters. Bamboo is highly invasive and damaging in the United States as it is an aggressive spreader. There are two species that are especially problematic in Virginia: Phyllostachys aurea (Golden Bamboo) and Phyllostachys aureosulcata (Yellow Groove Bamboo). Once this plant is established, it is difficult to remove. Because it is an invasive species and will spread to neighboring yards, just say no to bamboo for your next landscaping project.

Eric Lisann v. Elizabeth Lisann is a domestic relations case which is primarily about when the unhappy couple separated. This date is important because it has repercussions for equitable distribution of the marital estate and spousal support among other matters. The circuit court found that the separation occurred on July 14, 2014, while Mr. Lisann said that the separate occurred four and a half years later in December 2018 when "he intended that the separation be permanent." The issue before the Court of Appeals is whether the circuit court erred in not finding that "conciliatory statements and activities" made by Ms. Lisann showed that she too did not consider the separation to have been permanent until 2018.

Before discussing the Court of Appeals' resolution of this case, let us take a moment to discuss a curious incident -- though not of a dog barking in the night. There were actually two opinion released in Lisann v. Lisann today, one published and one unpublished. These appeals both arise from the same appeal, No. 0120-22, and the same author, Judge Chaney, joined by Judges Athey and Raphael. The second opinion is unpublished and finds several errors in the judgment which require a remand. I do not recall seeing this done in any prior case and am not certain why the Court would elect to do so in this case. While the unpublished opinion is quite lengthy, given that both opinion have some duplication with respect to the recitation of the facts and proceedings, combining them into a single published opinion would not have proved a significant challenge. The most likely explanation is that the Court did not feel that the issues raised in the unpublished opinion warranted publication because they were based on well-established law. However, I can see no harm in having well-established law set out in a published opinion which the gives an up-to-date citation for those principals. It will be interesting to see if this is an aberration or the start of a trend.

Back to the issue of exactly when the Lisanns went their separate ways. The couple began maintaining separate residences in 2014, but maintain cordial, platonic relations in order to provide for the welfare of their children. The couple also celebrated their 25th Wedding Anniversary with dinner in May 2018. The wife occasionally expressed a desire to reconcile and offered to seek counseling, however counseling never occurred and the husband declined wife's offer to resume living in the same home.

The wife filed for divorce in October 2019 on the grounds of living separately and apart since 2014, while husband counterclaimed seeking an at fault divorce alleging adultery and desertion, asserting that the separation occurred in 2018. The circuit court opted for the earlier date, but did not give express reasons for this finding.

The Court of Appeals affirms, noting that the determination of the date of separation is a factual finding owed great deference. That deference required the Court to infer that the circuit court accepted wife's allegation that she intended the separation to be permanent in 2014. The Court finds that the wife's intention is sufficient to establish the date of separation even if husband's intention was different.

As to the wife's expressions of affection and a desire to reconcile, the Court found that an intent to reconcile, without more, is not sufficient to interrupt the running of the period of separation toward the statutory requirement of living separate and apart for 1 year. In doing so, the Court rejects husband's argument that the General Assembly intended for the intent to separate be either permanent or continuous. Rather, the Court finds that the issues are 1) when did the parties actually separate, that is, when did one party form the intent to separate from the other and then by some action manifest this intent, and 2) did the parties there after live separate and apart for more than 1 year without regard to whether the intent was continual throughout that period. So long as the parties did not manifest the intent to cease living separately by word or deed, it is not necessary for them to show that the intent to remain separated was constantly firm.

The Court also rejected the husband's argument that this interpretation could lead to a spouse being sandbagged by a no fault divorce claim where, for example, a husband and wife have a spat just before one of them leaves on an extended business trip that lasts a year. The Court found that such circumstances would not satisfy the requirement of the Code that the separation be evinced by other indicia of marital separation. Finally, the Court noted that requiring a continual desire to separate would interfere with efforts toward seeking reconciliation.

Tadashi D. Guest v. Commonwealth of Virginia is a short opinion with an even shorter concurrence. Judge Ortiz, joined by Sr. Judge Haley, writes the 8-page majority and Judge Chaney concurs in little more than a page. The issue is whether Guest's conviction for a violation of Code § 18.2-104 was improper because by the time he was convicted, the General Assembly had repealed that statute. Prior to July 1, 2021, the statute created a "three strikes" felony offense of petty larceny. Under the statute, a person convicted of a third or subsequent offense of petty larceny was guilty of a felony with regard to when the prior convictions had occurred or how much the property was valued at. The usual argument against such laws is that they can turn truly petty offenses into felonies, such as the kleptomaniac who only steals chewing gum and manages to keep his sticky fingered proclivity under control, but gets caught the three times he fails to do so, and is eventually declared a felon for the theft of a few dollars of worth of Fruitstripe.

When Virginia reformed its larceny statutes and raised the limit for petty larceny, it also repealed the three strikes law effective July 1, 2021. Just a few months before that date, however, Guest went to a home improvement store and helped himself to nearly a $1000 in items which he ten attempted to return. This is actually a very common scam for such retail establishments, and employees at the return desks are trained to spot the flim-flammers and it usually isn't that hard. Such was the case with Guest, who being denied the refund, left the store with the items. Apparently the employee was distrustful enough to question the request for a refund, but not enough to suspect that Guest hadn't actually bought the items to begin with.

Give Guest credit for sticking to his game. He went back to the store and tried again. This time the employee at the return desk must have been new, because Guest managed to get the refund as store credit and then bought some items with the credit. However, the police eventually caught up with Guest in early June after the store's loss prevention team presumably realized it's employees had been taken unawares twice and filed a complaint.

Guest already had a least one prior petty larceny offense, and was charged under the three-strikes law. By the time he was brought to trial, Guest entered a plea which gave the circuit court a free hand in sentencing. Guest advised the court that if sentenced to more than six months active time, he would lose veteran's benefits. The court was unmoved and sentenced Guest to 5 years, with 18 months to serve.

Now, when you enter a guilty plea, there are really only a few ways you can appeal. One is to allege that the Commonwealth reneged on the deal, but that didn't happen here. The other two ways are 1) that the conviction is void, and 2) that the judge abused his or her discretion in imposing sentence. Guest tries both.

First he contends that once the General Assembly had repealed the three strikes law, it was a "non-existent crime" and his conviction was a nullity. It is on this point that the majority and the concurrence split hairs. The majority says that a prior decision of the Court held that the repeal of Code § 18.2-104 was not retroactive, but it must still decide whether the triggering

event under Code § 1-239 is the indictment or the criminal offense. Code § 1-239 is the statute that determine whether the repeal of a criminal statute results in continued liability for the offense and whether there is any mitigation of punishment.

The distinction between the case that determined the repeal was not retroactive and this case is that in the former both the offense and the indictment occurred before July 1, 2021, where Guest was not indicted until after the repeal was effective. The majority concludes that because Guest "committed his offense 'against the former law,' when the former law was

in full force and effect," the timing of the indictment does not impact the application of the former law. Judge Chaney would have dispensed with the majority's approach and simply held that because the prosecution of Guest commenced with his arrest and preliminary hearing in June, before the repeal took effect.

The full court has no issue with the alleged abuse of discretion in the sentence. The sentence was within the lawful range and no evidence suggested that the court ignored Guest's plea for mercy . . . it simply didn't find mercy was warranted.

Jason Lamont Burford v. Commonwealth of Virginia is an appeal of a revocation of suspended sentences. Like a great many revocation cases lately, the issue turns on whether Burford committed a "technical" violation limiting the circuit court's jurisdiction to impose active time. Burford was convicted of sexual battery, assault and battery, and stalking and was required to serve 6 months of a 36 month combined sentence. Upon release, despite being told that he was required to report to a probation officer, Burford initially complied, but upon moving to a new jurisdiction to which his supervision was transferred, insisted, quite vocally, that he was on unsupervised probation.

Burford's refusal was entirely without justification as he was able to produce a document which stated that he would be placed on unsupervised probation. However, the Commonwealth argued, and the circuit court agreed, that the overwhelming weight of the evidence showed that Burford had been told multiple times that he was subject to supervision. The question then became whether Burford's violation was only "a first technical," for which not active time could be imposed, or a violation of a special condition of his suspended sentence which permitted the court to set any active sentence within the range of the suspended time. The court opted for the latter, imposed six additional months of active time.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals, Judge Athey joined by Judges Beales and O'Brien, first finds that the court did not err in concluding that Burford was adequately informed that he was subject to supervised probation. Revocation hearings are not subject to a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof, but merely a preponderance, and there was adequate evidence that Burford should have known he was required to cooperate with the probation officer.

Whether the violation was "technical" or not turns on whether the violation was for not cooperating with the probation officer, a technical violation, or not complying with the terms of the suspended sentence, a "regular" violation (for lack of a better term). While Burford's action was that he refused to cooperate with the probation officer, the actual violation was not completing therapy which was a special condition of his suspended sentence. The Court of Appeals affirms the court's exercise of its jurisdiction to impose active time.

2 Criminal Decisions, 1 Worker's Compensation & 1 Domestic Case -- What happened to the new regime?

Four new decisions from the Court of Appeals today, and the first one starts off with a bang, or rather a bang-bang-bang. Patrick Daytione Taylor v. Commonwealth of Virginia involves and appeal from a conviction under Code § 18.2-287.4, which prohibits the carrying of a “semi-automatic center-fire . . . pistol . . . in the City of Richmond." Now this is an a very specific definition for a statute, and to be honest my familiarity with firearms does not extend to what a “semi-automatic center-fire . . . pistol" is. Now, one would think that Google would be the perfect tool for discovering the answer to this question, and this is the answer it gave, "As the name suggests, a centerfire round contains the primer in the center of the cartridge. Therefore, the power ignites when the firing pin of the firearm strikes the center of the cartridge."

So, if understand correctly, "center-fire" refers to the type of cartridge the weapon is designed to expel. The other type of cartridge is called a "rim-firm" and is "inherently less reliable than center-fire ammunition." However, rim-fire ammo is also 1) cheaper and 2) preferred for target practice and "varmint" shooting, while center-fire is preferred for bigger game, self-defense and, it would seem, the criminal element in Richmond and other urban areas mentioned in Code § 18.2-287.4.

Taylor was open-carrying a Taurus PT111 which normally hold 12 rounds, but with an extended magazine, which Taylor had, it holds 24, and that is what brought him to police attention. The officer said that he recognized the weapon and was aware that it fell within the ambit of the statute and, therefore stopped Taylor (who, when he saw the officer, began to move quickly away) to inquire if he had a concealed carry permit.

Wait, What? Taylor was opening carrying, so why would the officer ask if Taylor had a concealed carry permit?

While Virginia is an "open carry" state, a weapon with an extended magazine requires a concealed carry permit to open carry in the City of Richmond (as well as quite a few other urban areas as already mentioned). Look, don't try to make sense of needing a concealed carry permit to open carry, but only in certain cities and counties . . . just accept that this what the law requires for a weapon like this, which looks like it would be difficult to conceal anyway.

Anyway, Taylor was given a summons, duly appeared, and was convicted after his motion to suppress based on the illegality of the stop. On appeal he challenged the stop again, but the Court of Appeals, Judge Raphael joined by Judge White and Sr. Judge Petty, chose to decide the case on a much narrower ground -- the absence of proof that a Taurus PT111 is a center-fire pistol.

At trial, the Commonwealth did not introduce the weapon into evidence and present no testimony or forensic analysis that showed the weapon was designed to expel center-fire ammunition. The Commonwealth argued, and the circuit court agreed, that it could be inferred that the weapon was of that style. To which the Court of Appeals replies, and I am paraphrasing here, but only just, "Really? How would one infer that?" Simply put, even if the trial judge was an expert in firearms and could have taken judicial notice of the fact that the Taurus PT111 is a center-fire pistol (and it is), the court did not do so here. So for the court to infer an necessary element of the offense where no testimony remotely would give rise to that inference leaves the evidence lacking as to that element. The conviction is reversed and the summons dismissed.

Today's other criminal defendant is not so fortunate. In Jonathan Brenton Griffin v. Commonwealth of Virginia, the defendant, a former police officer, was convicted of assault and battery for using excessive force against a handcuffed man in his custody. Griffin was subject to both an administrative and criminal investigation by the same officer, which give rise to his first assignment of error, which asserted that this violated Griffin's due process rights. Next, when tried, Griffin raised a Batson challenge to the Commonwealth's use of peremptory strikes. Third, he contends that the trial court erred by denying the admission of certain evidence concerning the victim’s character. Fourth, he contends that the trial court did not properly instruct the jury. Finally, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he committed assault and battery.

Whew! Not quite a "kitchen sink" appeal, but getting darn close.

I won't go into a great deal of the facts, as they are not really the crux of the appeal. Griffin was a residential community officer who took a resident into emergency custody and transported him to a local emergency room. While waiting to complete the registration process, Griffin apparently became aggravated by the man's fidgeting and kicked his legs out from under him, resulting in the man face-planting in to floor and sustaining injuries. Evidence of hospital employees substantiated that the assault was unprovoked.

An initial administrative investigation found that Griffin's actions did not rise to the level of criminal activity, but the police chief order a criminal investigation to be commenced. The same officer conducted the criminal investigation that result in Griffin being charged with assault and battery.

Griffin maintained that because he was required to participate in the administrative proceeding, the same officer should not have been allowed to conduct the criminal investigation as he was aware of Griffin's compelled Garrity statements, referring to a 1967 Supreme Court case in which this was found to be a violation of the 5th amendment right against self-incrimination. The Court of Appeals, Judge Beales joined by Judges Fulton and Lorish, found that Garrity did not apply here because the Commonwealth obtained all of its incriminating evidence “from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony.” Griffin statements were not in the material give to the Commonwealth and from which it made the charging decision and were not used at trial.

During trial, Griffin raised a Batson challenge to the Commonwealth's using its peremptory strikes to remove four white male jurors. The circuit court accepted the Commonwealth's gender and race neutral reasons for the strikes. The Court of Appeals found that Griffin failed to preserve his claim of pretextual reasons to two of the jurors and the court did not err in accepting the reasons given for striking the other two.

Griffin sought to introduce character evidence about the victim's mental health and criminal history. Relying on two rules of evidence, Griffin argued that this evidence was admissible to show that the victim was potentially dangerous and combative. However, the first of these rules applies only where a defendant has raise a defense of self-defense, which Griffin had not, and the latter applied only if the facts were known to to officer at the time, which they were not, and mostly consisted of incidents after the event at the hospital.

Griffin proffered a jury instruction on the right of police officer to use non-lethal force, which the Court describes as "long, argumentative, and not a neutral statement of the law." The Court found that Griffin was not entitled to the instruction. Similarly, the Court found no error in the circuit court having preferred the Commonwealth's instructions on the elements of battery and that any potential error was resolved by a clarifying instruction given by the circuit court.

The third opinion today is LKQ Corporation and CCMSI v. Joseph Galarreta Morales. This is a case from another of the Court of Appeals' old stomping grounds, the Workers' Compensation Commission. Morales was injured in an industrial accident arising from the wreck of the 26-foot box truck he was driving in 2015. Over the years, Morales was either given light duty or taken off work entirely. In 2020, he was again released to light duty pending a corrective surgery. After the surgery, he was again rated as not able to work.

While off work, Morales allegedly refused to participate in vocational rehabilitation. The employer and carrier sought to terminate his benefits. A deputy commissioner agreed and Morales appealed to the full Commission. A majority of the Commission found that the employer and carrier had not met their burden of showing that the rehabilitation was appropriate to Morales' off-work status -- that is, was he capable of performing vocational therapy which was in many regards the equivalent of performing work duties.

The employer and the carrier appealed to the Court of Appeals, which today, Judge Beales writing for himself and Judges Fulton and Lorish again, finds that the Commission majority was correct. To be clear, the issue in this case was not whether Morales could do was the therapy required and the his refusal to do so was unjustified. Rather, the employer and carrier were required to approve that the vocational therapy was appropriate to his no work rating. Without evidence that the therapy was appropriate, there is no basis for saying that Moarles' refusal was unjustified.

Something of a rarity from the Court of Appeals, the last decision today is a published order from the third main area of the "old" jurisdiciton of the Court . . . or rather not from that jurisdiction as we shall. The reason that Judges Humphreys, Malveaux, and Fulton chose to publish this order is to provide precedent for the finding that the Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction over subject matter jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal of a pendite lite order requiring Maeng Jong Choi to pay retroactive and ongoing spousal support at the time the order was entered. However, shortly after the order was entered, the law was changed to give the court that power -- but this was not retroactive so the Court still didn't have jurisdiction over this case. But wait, there's more, while the appeal was pending, the General Assembly changed the law again and took back the power and did not include a savings clause, so even if the Court could have bootstrapped its jurisdiction, it wasn't going to do so in light of the subsequent action of the General Assembly.

Three Appeals -- The Reversal Is Important

Last week the Court of Appeals issued a single opinion and then two more today, and while the Commonwealth was the appellee in all three, only to are appeals from cases in which the defendant was convicted of a crime. Let's start with one of the criminal cases -- the one that resulted in a reversal: Jesse Ryan Hackett, s/k/a Jessi Ryan Hackett v. Commonwealth of Virginia. Code § 18.2-460(E) makes it a Class 1 misdemeanor to knowingly flee from a law-enforcement officer attempting to make a lawful arrest, but only if the officer “applies physical force to the person” or has “the immediate physical ability to place the person under arrest.”

This case deals with the latter potential. Hackett was subject to arrest on a felony warrant and a Lynchburg police officer drove to a residence where he hoped to find him and parked at the end of the street. Hackett was indeed at the residence, in fact he was standing right out front. As the officer approached and was about 20 to 25 yards away, the two made eye contact and Hackett took off like a jack rabbit that startled a rattlesnake. Well, except this was in Lynchburg, not Texas, and it was January, and it was snowing, but you get the idea. Hackett managed to elude police (including backup) for about an hour, when the original offer spotted him from about 50 yards away and Hackett again did a jack rabbit (or perhaps he did a snowshoe rabbit) when the officer commanded him to "stop."

When Hackett was finally apprehended sometime later, in addition to the felony already charged, he was charged with violation Code § 18.2-460(E), apparently by direct indictment because there was not trial in the general district court. At the trial on that charge, Hackett moved to strike at the close of the Commonwealth's evidence, asserting that the officer never had the "immediate physical ability" to arrest Hackett. The circuit court denied the motion and Hackett appealed.

As the lede told you that this was the reversal, you know what is coming. The Court of Appeals, Judge Raphael joined by Judge Friedman, with Judge Fulton concurring separately, found that the officer was never more than 20 yards close to Hackett and at that distance, the officer was not in a position to place Hackett under arrest, no was the verbal command to stop from 50 yards away relevant, because while the statute includes a provision that the officer communicates to the person that he is under arrest and "a reasonable person who receives such communication knows or should know that he is not free to leave," that provision is stated in the conjunctive with "the officer has the legal authority and the immediate physical ability to place the person under arrest."

Judge Fulton's concurrence is based on his disagreement with the majority that the defendant must be within the "immediate span" of the officer control -- a term, which he notes, the majority does not defined -- but he agrees that however close the officer has to be, 20 yards is too far.

An important distinction in this case and the offense of "escape from custody" is that the latter offense requires the defendant to be in actual custody before fleeing. In that scenario, the distance between the defendant and the officer at the time of flight is irrelevant, because one you have been detained -- whether physically or by submission to authority -- you cannot go unless and until the officer (or the court) says you can, and fleeing anytime before that is escape even if the nearest officer is in the next room . . . or the next county.

The second criminal appeal, Timothy Miles, s/k/a Timothy L. Miles v. Commonwealth of Virginia, is also 2-1-0 appeal, which may explain why it is published. A jury convicted Timothy Miles of six counts of unlawfully discharging a firearm in an occupied building, in violation of Code § 18.2-279, reduced from maliciously discharging a firearm in an occupied building, and acquitted him of attempted capital murder of a law enforcement officer and use of a firearm in the commission of that felony. All in all, not a bad result.

But Miles what not satisfied. According to him, there were not six separate offenses, because he fired six shots randomly and rapidly in succession, making it a single act of "firing." That's a creative, but not unreasonable argument. However, Miles was not done. He also argued that the building was not occupied because the only other person in the apartment was the officer investigating a prior report of shots fired, and the officer was not an "occupant" of the apartment. The capital murder charges arose out of the officer being wounded by one of Miles' "random" shots. And that was not even his most creative argument. Miles also argued that because the jury was not properly instructed on criminal negligence, he was convicted of a "non-offense" of "heat-of-passion discharge of a firearm."

This very creative argument was addressed first by the majority, Sr. Judge Haley joined by Judge Ortiz, which found that while Miles raised this issue after the verdict, he in fact had agreed to the jury instruction that he subsequently claimed permitted the jury to convict him of a "non-offense." The majority said that this was approbating and reprobating, and the objection was untimely besides, and the ends of justice did not require them to forgive either of these sins. Judge Chaney concurred, saying there was no need to procedurally bar the argument because Miles' assertion that the jury convicted him of the "non-offense" was so much buncombe, and the jury was properly instructed.

As to the slightly less creative, but still creative argument, that the officer was not an "occupant" of the apartment, the Court states that in this context "occupied" means that another human is present, and has nothing to do with the right to occupy. Similar the most legitimate issue -- is six shots rapidly fired a single offense of firing -- is on of practicality, Regardless of how rapidly Miles pulled the trigger, he had to pull it six times. The six actions of discharging the firearm. One supposes that this leaves open the question of what the Court would do if a defendant had a submachine gun set to full auto and empty the clip in a single action.

The final case, the one released last week, is Nigel Elliot Walker v. Commonwealth of Virginia, and as explained, does not involve a conviction. Walker was acquitted, in 2016, of first degree murder upon a finding that he was insane at the time of the offense. Walker was duly committed to Central State Hospital and responded well to treatment. In 2020, Walker was released to a transitional living facility in what is know as a conditional release.

In 2022, Walker was recommended for independent living. He would still be subject to certain conditions and monitoring, but he would essentially be living in the community without restrictions. The Commonwealth opposed the plan. The Court of Appeals, Chief Judge Decker joined by Judges Maleveaux and Causey, has recited the evidence and argument presented in the circuit court on both sides, and frankly, its a very close case. The circuit court was clearly sympathetic to Walker and his recovery, but ultimately found that the continuing danger to the public and the nature of the underlying offense, weighed against permitting Walker to be permitted to live independently at this time.

The Court affirmed this judgment, primarily because it ultimately to the circuit court exercise of its discretion. As in so many instances, an appellate judge may have exercised that discretion differently, but that does not make the trial court's actions abusive.

On average, person acquitted by reason on insanity are not eligible for full release without any monitoring for many years after the are allowed on community release. Typically, the average time in confined custody is 5 years, but this is skewed by those acquittees how do not respond (or refuse) treatment and, thus, are never released. Walker is clearly ahead of the curve, but I cannot find fault with the Court of Appeals affirmance of the trial court's caution. Walker will be eligible for future reviews and, undoubtedly, if he continues to respond well to treatment and maintain his compliance with the terms of his release, he will eventually be granted more freedom.